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INTRODUCTION

Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ+) youth are
five times more likely than their heterosexual peers to attempt suicide.1
Suicide attempts are even more prevalent among LGBTQ+ survivors of
conversion therapy.2 Compared to other LGBTQ+ people, conversion
therapy survivors are 92% more likely to experience lifetime suicidal
ideation, 75% more likely to attempt suicide that results in significant
injuries, and 88% more likely to attempt suicide that results in minor
injuries.3 Conversion therapy is demonstrably damaging to LGBTQ+ youth,
yet this dangerous practice continues across the United States.4
In December 1973, the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”)
officially issued a resolution declaring that it would no longer consider

1. E.g., Facts About Suicide, THE TREVOR PROJECT (Aug. 20, 2021),
http://web.archive.org/web/20210814180331/https://www.thetrevorproject.org/resource
s/preventing-suicide/facts-about-suicide/ (giving the facts about suicide among
LGBTQ+ youth from the leading national organization that provides crisis intervention
for LGBTQ+ youth).
2. See generally, Press Release, WILLIAMS INST., LGB People Who Have
Undergone Conversion Therapy Almost Twice as Likely to Attempt Suicide (June 15,
2020) [hereinafter WILLIAMS INST.], https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/lgbsuicide-ct-press-release/ (discussing the impact of SOCE on LGBTQ+ youth).
3. See WILLIAMS INST., supra note 2 (examining the mental trauma of survivors of
SOCE).
4. See Progress Map, THE TREVOR PROJECT (June 15, 2021) [hereinafter Progress
Map], https://web.archive.org/web/20210505050152/https:/www.thetrevorproject.org
/get-involved/trevor-advocacy/50-bills-50-states/progress-map/ (providing information
on the introduction and adoption of laws limiting SOCE).
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homosexuality a mental disorder.5 For nearly a century before this
resolution, the APA and many psychiatrists held the view that homosexuality
was a mental disease that caused abnormal behavior.6 Consequently, many
mental health professionals believed that homosexuality was akin to any
other disease and could be “cured” through treatment like other diseases.7
Since 1973, the United States has taken significant steps forward in
recognizing the rights of LGBTQ+ people.8 However, LGBTQ+ people
continue to face widespread discrimination based on their sexual orientation
and/or gender identity.9 This continued stigmatization parallels the
continuation of the discriminatory belief that homosexuality is a mental
disorder.10 As a result of this belief, some counselors and therapists continue
to practice treatments for same-sex attraction and non-binary or transgender
identification.11 These treatments are referred to as conversion therapy,
sexual orientation change efforts (“SOCE”), and gender identity change
efforts (“GICE”) and are typically practiced by mental health providers or
through faith-based ministries.12 The most common technique involved in
conversion therapy is talk therapy, but conversion therapy practitioners still
5. See generally, Allison Turner, Today in 1973, APA Removed Homosexuality
From List of Mental Illnesses, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.hrc.org/news/flashbackfriday-today-in-1973-the-apa-removedhomosexuality-from-list-of-me (providing an overview on the historical changes in the
continued fight for LGBTQ+ rights).
6. See Richard D. Lyons, Psychiatrists, in a Shift, Declare Homosexuality No
Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 1973),.https://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/16
/archives/psychiatrists-in-a-shift-declare-homosexuality-no-mental-illness.html
(providing historical context on shifts in opinions on SOCE).
7. See id. (reviewing the prior classification of homosexuality as a mental disease
and early SOCE).
8. See Turner, supra note 5 (discussing the changing views of society and the
mental health field on homosexuality). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003) (striking down sodomy laws which was a significant step forward in LGBTQ+
rights); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (securing gay marriage and
creating greater equality in human rights across the spectrum of sexualities).
9. See The Trevor Project National Survey, THE TREVOR PROJECT (Aug. 20, 2021),
https://www.thetrevorproject.org/survey-2021/?section=Discrimination (providing the
2021 survey results of LGBTQ+ youth and finding widespread discrimination with “75%
of LGBTQ youth . . . had experienced discrimination”).
10. See Turner, supra note 5 (discussing the continued discrimination and challenges
faced by LGBTQ+ people).
11. E.g., Progress Map, supra note 4 (defining what conversion therapy entails and
how it continues to harm LGBTQ+ youth).
12. See Progress Map, supra note 4 (giving background on what is included under
the banner of SOCE and how it is typically carried out).
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use more aversive forms.13 Even in its less aversive form, the testimonials
of conversion therapy survivors demonstrate that all forms of conversion
therapy are demonstrably harmful to LGBTQ+ youth.14 In recognition of the
harm caused by conversion therapy, numerous states have recently adopted
laws to regulate conversion therapy.15
As of August 2021, twenty-five states have adopted laws that protect
minors from conversion therapy, and another sixteen states have introduced
similar bills.16 Unsurprisingly given the contentious debate around
conversion therapy, mental health providers, religious groups, and parents
that support the continued usage of conversion therapy have challenged the
constitutionality of laws that limit conversion therapy.17 While numerous
challenges have been made, these challenges have mainly persisted in the
form of freedom of speech challenges to the constitutionality of anti-SOCE
laws.18 Challengers claimed these regulations violated their freedom of
speech by restricting what they, as therapists and counselors, could say and
prevented them from expressing their own viewpoints.19 Early free speech
challenges were rejected by the Third and Ninth Circuits, which upheld the
constitutionality of laws restricting conversion therapy.20
However, the Supreme Court in National Institute of Family and Life
13. See generally Progress Map, supra note 4 (providing an overview on the
different forms of conversion therapy, including aversive practices and talk therapy).
14. See Hum. Rts. Campaign, LGBTQ “Conversion Therapy” Survivor: “They Got
Some Weird Joy Out of Torturing Children” YOUTUBE (May 16, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i13JbzSnk94&amp;ab_channel=HumanRightsCam
paign (detailing the experiences of a survivor at a conversion therapy camp in which she
and other minors were subject to continued mental and physical abuse).
15. E.g., Progress Map, supra note 4 (tracking which states have adopted laws
limiting SOCE and discussing the wide range of attitudes towards conversion therapy
across the nation).
16. See Progress Map, supra note 4 (tracking which states adopted bans on SOCE).
17. Compare Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014) (adjudicating
the constitutionality of CA’s SOCE ban on free speech grounds), with King v. Governor
of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) (examining the challenge to New
Jersey’s SOCE ban on free speech grounds).
18 See generally Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1226-32 (claiming that the regulations restrict
free speech); King, 767 F.3d 216 at 216 (claiming the New Jersey law limits freedom of
speech).
19 See generally Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1226-32 (focusing on plaintiff’s claimed freedom
of speech violations); King, 767 F.3d 216 at (reiterating plaintiff’s claim that their
constitutional freedom of speech rights were violated).
20. Compare Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222 (ruling that the law was not unconstitutional
on any of the challenged grounds), with King, 767 F.3d 216 at 233 (finding that the law
was not unconstitutional on freedom of speech grounds).
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Advocates v. Becerra shook the foundation of both court’s decisions by
undermining the concept of professional speech as a category within free
speech.21 This concept was one of the fundamental theoretical underpinnings
of both circuit courts’ decisions.22 In Becerra, the Supreme Court abrogated
the lower courts’ reasoning that professional speech was a category of speech
deserving of a lower standard of constitutional protection.23 Following the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Becerra, the Eleventh Circuit, in Otto v. City of
Boca Raton, became the first circuit to hold that a law limiting conversion
therapy was unconstitutional.24 The court’s decision in Otto demonstrates
the stark differences among the lower courts on the constitutionality of anticonversion therapy laws.25
This Comment argues that laws prohibiting mental health professionals
from engaging in conversion therapy with minors are constitutional and do
not violate the First Amendment.26 Part II of this Comment gives
background on the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions.27 Part III
argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Otto was incorrect.28 Part IV
recommends that the Supreme Court review the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision.29 Finally, Part V concludes by reiterating that laws banning

21 See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369-78 (2018)
(rejecting officially that professional speech was a lesser protected category of free
speech).
22. See id. at 2365 (emphasizing that “speech is not unprotected merely because it is
uttered by professionals”).
23. E.g., id. at 2371 (arguing that the law was a regulation of professional speech
which is a special category of speech that does not deserve full protection).
24. Compare id. at 2372 (refusing to accept that professional speech is a special
category of speech), with Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2020)
(ruling that restricting mental health providers from practicing SOCE was
unconstitutional and that no professional speech exception may apply).
25. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 859 (finding that the ban was unconstitutional on freedom
of speech considerations).
26. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that “[C]ongress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”).
27. See infra Part II (providing background information on the development of the
law relevant to the constitutionality of laws banning SOCE. Focusing on the rulings of
the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits and the Supreme Court’s ruling on professional
speech).
28. See infra Part III (discussing and pushing back on Otto and arguing that the laws
do not violate freedom of speech even under the highest standard of strict scrutiny).
29. See infra Part IV (giving policy recommendations on SOCE and recommending
that the Supreme Court officially reviews the issue).
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conversion therapy are constitutional.30
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Circuit Courts’ Differing Approaches to Conversion Therapy
Bans Create Confusion on the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny and
Constitutionality of these Laws
1. The Ninth Circuit Found that SOCE Bans are Permissible under
Rational Basis Review Because the Bans Pertain to “Professional Speech”
California (“CA”) was the first state to adopt a law prohibiting licensed
mental health professionals from engaging in conversion therapy with
minors.31 Opponents challenged the new law’s constitutionality on the
grounds that it violated parents’ fundamental rights to make medical
decisions for their children.32 They also argued that this law infringed on the
First Amendment freedoms of religion, association, and speech.33
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the law was both vague and
overbroad.34 The Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed the freedom of religion
claims and quickly found no breaches of the freedom of association or
parents’ fundamental rights.35 The court also promptly dismissed vagueness
and overbreadth arguments.36 Instead, the court focused most of its
discussion on the alleged violations of the plaintiffs’ freedom of speech.37
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the alleged breaches of freedom of speech
30. See infra Part V (concluding that even under strict scrutiny, state and local
governments may limit or ban mental health professionals from engaging in SOCE with
minors).
31. See generally Progress Map, supra note 4 (tracking the adoption of laws that
limit SOCE, CA has protected minors from conversion therapy by state law since 2012).
32. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1235 (9th Cir. 2014) (questioning whether
a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions in their child’s care includes the right to
pursue medical treatments that the state has deemed harmful).
33. See id. at 1224-25 (discussing the multitude of constitutional challenges that
were thrown at limiting conversion therapy).
34. E.g., id. at 1225 (arguing that the law should be held void for vagueness and was
not narrowly tailored).
35. E.g., id. at 1232-36 (dismissing the freedom of religion claims, and association
claims, and fundamental rights claim).
36. E.g., id. at 1232-34 (rejecting basis for the claims because the law was clear in
putting mental health providers on notice of legal conduct and narrow in its regulation of
specific conduct).
37. See generally id. at 1227–31 (discussing freedom of speech doctrine and its
implications on the California law at issue).
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focused on determining which level of scrutiny applied.38 The court’s
analysis first looked at whether the law attempted to regulate speech or
conduct.39 The circuit court contemplated that, while the speech of medical
professionals is not wholly insulated from regulation by the First
Amendment, it is still entitled to protection.40 The court concluded that in a
spectrum of speech protections, the law fell into the gray zone of
“professional conduct.”41 According to the court, professional conduct is
exempt from the typical rule that content-based speech regulations are
subject to strict scrutiny.42 In this area of exemption, the powers of the state
are great, and regulation is permissible even if it may have an incidental
effect on speech.43 Following this reasoning, the circuit court believed that
rational basis review was the correct test to apply and that the law was
constitutional.44 While the freedom of speech arguments were easily
surmounted in this case, these same few issues have continued to be the
sticking points regarding the constitutionality of conversion therapy bans in
other courts as well.45
2. The Third Circuit Allows SOCE Under Intermediate Scrutiny Because
it is a Lesser Protected Category of Speech
The Third Circuit was the next circuit court to rule on the constitutionality
of limiting SOCE.46 New Jersey’s state government enacted its own ban in
38. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229 (expanding on the necessity of determining the
correct level of scrutiny in constitutional analysis).
39. See id. (deciding that the California law primarily regulated conduct and not
speech).
40. See id. at 1226 (reasoning that the speech falls into a gray zone that receives
some but not all constitutional protections).
41. E.g., id. at 1229 (discussing the existence of professional speech and that the
category is more traditionally regulated by the law).
42. See id. at 1228 (determining that professional speech is not deserving of the full
scope of constitutional protections because it is an area that has traditionally been
regulated by the government).
43. See id. at 1229 (discussing the traditional regulation of speech in this category).
44. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231-32 (reasoning that the rational basis test should be
applied based on historical and legal precedent).
45. Compare id. at 1231 (finding that the California law was able to pass rational
basis review), with King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 220-40 (3d Cir. 2014)
(deciding that the New Jersey law passes intermediate scrutiny), and Otto v. City of Boca
Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 860-71 (11th Cir. 2020) (concluding that strict scrutiny is
appropriate and the law did not pass).
46. E.g., King, 767 F.3d at 220-240 (deciding on the constitutionality of the New
Jersey law).
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2013, which prohibited licensed counselors from engaging in SOCE with
minors.47 Mirroring the claims made by the plaintiffs in Pickup, the
plaintiffs, who were involved in conversion therapy solely through speechbased talk therapy, alleged that the law violated their constitutional rights.48
While the plaintiffs made additional claims of constitutional violations, the
bulk of the court’s discussion again focused on freedom of speech.49
The Third Circuit differed from the Ninth Circuit when determining that
the law regulated speech and not conduct.50 Since the Third Circuit
approached its analysis of talk therapy as speech, its analysis turned on
whether or not said speech fell into one of the historically lesser protected
categories of speech that the Supreme Court has identified.51 The Third
Circuit paralleled the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that the state has a valid and
historically recognized interest in regulating professional speech and that
SOCE fell into this lesser protected category.52 However, the Third Circuit
reviewed the law’s constitutionality under intermediate scrutiny.53 Under
this standard, the circuit court concluded that New Jersey had satisfied
intermediate scrutiny because the law was substantially related to protecting
the wellbeing of minors and was therefore constitutional.54
3. The Supreme Court in Becerra Determined that Professional Speech is
not a Separate Category of Speech and Does Not Lie Outside of Normal
First Amendment Freedom of Speech Protections
While there were distinct differences in how the Ninth and Third circuits
approached the freedom of speech claims, each circuit court still heavily
relied upon the idea that professional speech fits within a category of speech
47. See id. at 221 (stating that the law prohibited mental health providers from
engaging in SOCE with minors).
48. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1224 (reiterating the plaintiffs’ claims that the law
infringed on their free speech rights); King, 767 F.3d at 220-240 (reviewing Plaintiff’s
claims that the law infringed on their constitutional rights).
49. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1225-32 (discussing how freedom of speech is
implicated by the law).
50. Compare id. (determining that the law was primarily regulating conduct and not
speech), with King, 767 F.3d at 229 (ruling that the law was regulating speech).
51. See King, 767 F.3d at 229 (examining the appropriate level of scrutiny and the
different categories of speech).
52. See id. at 232-35 (discussing why professional speech is a gray area for which
strict scrutiny does not apply).
53. See id. at 237 (reasoning that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because the
speech was professional speech).
54. See id. at 238 (finding that New Jersey had satisfied intermediate scrutiny
because the law was substantially related to an important government interest).
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that is less deserving of the First Amendment’s full freedom of speech
protections.55 Furthermore, upon this bedrock idea of professional speech
exemptions, each circuit court weighed the laws against lower standards of
scrutiny and found the laws constitutional.56 However, the Supreme Court’s
decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocacy v. Becerra would
ultimately shatter the bedrock foundations of these opinions.57
While Becerra did not directly relate to the issue of conversion therapy,
its decision had profound impacts on the legal discussion surrounding
conversion therapy.58 Becerra revolved around California’s FACT Act and
what disclosures crisis pregnancy centers were legally required to make.59
The plaintiffs invoked a freedom of speech argument by claiming that the
government could not compel their speech.60 In this case, defenders of the
FACT Act’s constitutionality relied on the principle that a lower level of
scrutiny applied to regulations on professional speech.61 The Supreme Court
summarily rejected this line of reasoning in its majority opinion.62
According to the Supreme Court, it had “never recognized ‘professional
speech’ as a separate category of speech subject to different rules” and

55. Compare Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215-36 (determining that the law primarily
regulates conduct and professional speech), with King, 767 F.3d 216 at 220-240
(concluding that the law regulates professional speech and is not subject to strict
scrutiny).
56. See King, 767 F.3d at 220-240 (applying intermediate scrutiny); Pickup, 740
F.3d at 1215-36 (utilizing only rational basis review); see also Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life
Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018) (describing the FACT Act, otherwise
known as the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care
which was intended to regulate crisis pregnancy centers and the notices they were
required to make).
57. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2369-78 (focusing on
compelled speech rather than restricted speech and rejecting professional speech as a
category of free speech subject to lower scrutiny).
58. See id. at 2375 (declining to recognize professional speech as “a unique category
that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles”).
59. E.g., id. at 2368-70 (discussing the FACT Act and the freedom of speech basis
for the case).
60. E.g., id. at 2371 (implicating freedom of speech because the law compelled
speech on the part of health professionals).
61. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215-36 (acknowledging professional speech as its own
category of speech); King, 767 F.3d at 220-40 (utilizing the concept of professional
speech); but see Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2369-78 (rejecting the
claim of advocates that professional speech was its own category).
62. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2369-78 (rejecting that
professional speech is a category of speech exempt from strict scrutiny).
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“speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by professionals.”63
The Supreme Court summarily rejected the idea that professional speech
should be subjected to a lower level of scrutiny and instead pointed to
Supreme Court precedent, which had protected the First Amendment rights
of professionals under strict scrutiny.64
While the Supreme Court did not ultimately discuss conversion therapy
bans, the Supreme Court’s decision in Becerra dealt a considerable blow to
the legal reasoning of both courts.65 As the Ninth and Third Circuits ruled
on the issue of conversion therapy before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Becerra, the circuit courts’ reasoning is no longer fully congruent with the
new understanding of professional speech after Becerra.66 However, the
ramifications of Becerra were a definitive factor in the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision on the constitutionality of conversion therapy bans.67
B. Otto Diverges from its Predecessors and Finds SOCE
Unconstitutional Based on The Supreme Court’s Rejection of Professional
Speech in Becerra
The Eleventh Circuit declared that laws banning mental health
professionals from engaging in conversion therapy with minors were
unconstitutional in Otto v. City of Boca Raton.68 However, in 2017, Palm
Beach and the City of Boca Raton passed ordinances that banned mental

63. See id. at 2365 (failing to be persuaded by the argument for professional speech
as a lesser protected category of speech, not subject to strict scrutiny).
64. Compare id. at 2366 (rejecting the argument that the government has a traditional
interest in regulating professional speech), with Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S.
155, 170-72 (2015) (applying strict scrutiny to lawyer’s speech), and Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 573-80 (2011) (applying strict scrutiny to the professional
speech of medical professionals).
65. Compare Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2369-78 (rejecting the
idea that professional speech is not subject to strict scrutiny), with Pickup, 740 F.3d at
1230-36 (arguing for a lower standard for professional speech), and King, 767 F.3d at
220-40 (advocating for less protections for professional speech).
66. See generally Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229 (emphasizing that “within the confines
of a professional relationship, First Amendment protection of a professional's speech is
somewhat diminished”), and King, 767 F.3d at 228 (discussing that within the
professional relationship, constitutional speech protections are diminished).
67. E.g., Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 860-71 (11th Cir. 2020)
(adjudicating the constitutionality of bans on SOCE with minors after the rejection of
professional speech).
68. See generally id. (reviewing local ordinances that were very similar to the
California and New Jersey laws).
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health counselors from engaging in SOCE with minors.69 These ordinances
applied to conversion therapy intending to change a minor’s sexual
orientation or gender identity but included a carveout for clergy members
and counselors who supported those undergoing gender transition.70 Two
licensed therapists challenged the constitutionality of the city ordinances
because it infringed upon their First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.71
The majority opinion made three major legal decisions in Otto.72 First, the
court determined that the law was a content-based regulation that constituted
viewpoint discrimination.73 Second, the court determined that strict scrutiny
was the appropriate test for evaluating the city ordinances.74 Third, the court
found that the law did not pass strict scrutiny.75
1. The Eleventh Circuit Found that Strict Scrutiny was the Correct Test
to Apply to SOCE Bans
The argument for a lesser standard of scrutiny was much more potent
before Becerra, and the Ninth and Third Circuit made this argument when
applying rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny, respectively.76
Utilizing the Becerra decision, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the rationale of
the Ninth and Third Circuits and determined that the bans must pass strict
scrutiny, for which the law must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
69. See id. at 859 (examining both laws, which mandated the same limitation on
mental health providers).
70. Id. at 859–60 (providing the substance of the two laws which stated counselors
could not engage in SOCE with minors).
71. See generally id. at 860 (giving the background on the claims of Constitutional
infringements that were raised).
72. See id. at 860-70 (stating the circuit court’s reasoning on why the ban was
unconstitutional).
73. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 860, 864 (arguing that the law amounted to viewpoint
discrimination because it was not viewpoint-neutral).
74. See id. at 861 (examining the required level of scrutiny based on speech versus
conduct and the protected and lesser protected categories of free speech).
75. See id. at 868 (holding that the law did not pass strict scrutiny because the state
failed to demonstrate how SOCE harms minors).
76. Compare Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1230-131 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying
rational basis review because the law was regulating medical practices rather than pure
speech), with King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 226-37 (3d Cir. 2014)
(utilizing intermediate scrutiny because the law was seeking to regulate professional
speech which the government has a historically recognized interest in regulating), and
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371-78 (2018)
(abrogating the previous decisions in rejecting the concept of professional speech).
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government interest.77 The court determined that strict scrutiny was the
correct test to apply because, in their view, the ordinances were contentbased regulations of speech.78 The court rejected the idea that the ordinances
were laws regulating conduct that incidentally regulated speech.79 Instead,
they argued that the laws primarily targeted speech and were content-based
regulations.80 Content-based laws, which regulate based on the substance of
the message being communicated, are presumptively unconstitutional and
are given the highest level of constitutional protection, strict scrutiny.81
2. The Eleventh Circuit Found that SOCE Bans are Viewpoint
Discrimination
The Eleventh Circuit furthered its argument that strict scrutiny was the
correct test to apply in Otto by determining that the ordinances constituted
viewpoint discrimination.82 Viewpoint discrimination is considered a subset
and “a particularly ‘egregious form’ of content discrimination.”83 A law is
not viewpoint neutral but is viewpoint discriminatory when it involves bias
towards or the censorship of opposing viewpoints.84 According to the court,
the law in question advocated for “a particular viewpoint about sex, gender,
and sexual ethics” while censoring an opposing point of view.85 To support
their claim that the local government was engaging in viewpoint
discrimination, the court pointed out that the law in question created an
exception for gender transition counseling.86 In the eyes of the court, this
77. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 861-869 (applying strict scrutiny because the law was a
content-based restriction and viewpoint discrimination); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life
Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2371-75 (differing from the previous circuit courts’ interpretations
of the appropriate test that should be applied to the bans).
78. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 865 (determining the law was primarily regulating talk
therapy and therefore speech).
79. See id. at 865 (stating that the regulation of speech was direct rather than
indirect).
80. E.g., id. at 865-866 (focusing on the restrictions on speech).
81. See id. at 862 (examining approaches to content-based regulations).
82. See id. at 864 (finding the law was viewpoint discrimination because it censored
one point of view).
83. E.g., Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing how
viewpoint discrimination offends the core values of the First Amendment and the
expression of political beliefs).
84. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (finding
that law was viewpoint neutral because did not involve bias or censorship).
85. E.g., Otto, 981 F.3d at 864 (arguing that the law promotes one viewpoint while
censoring others).
86. See id. at 864 (utilizing this exception to demonstrate viewpoint discrimination).
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carveout confirmed that the ordinances codified one viewpoint about gender
and sexuality while prohibiting counselors from advancing other
perspectives and was, therefore, blatantly viewpoint discrimination.87
3. The Eleventh Circuit Found that SOCE Bans do not Pass Strict
Scrutiny
The court in Otto ruled that the ordinances in question did not pass strict
scrutiny.88 The court recognized that the compelling government interest
raised by the state, namely protecting the mental and physical wellbeing of
minors, was indeed a compelling government interest.89 However, the court
believed that the evidence presented by the defendants was insufficient to
demonstrate that conversion therapy harms minors.90 Instead, the court
argued that the research presented by the government was not empirically
rigorous enough to pass muster in the court’s eyes.91 Satisfied that the
defendants had failed to demonstrate cognizable harm sufficient for their
compelling government interest, the court did not address the issue of narrow
tailoring.92
III. ANALYSIS
Otto v. City of Boca Raton serves as a jumping-off point in evaluating the
constitutionality of laws banning mental health professionals from engaging
in sexual orientation change efforts or conversion therapy with minors.93
While the decisions of the Ninth and Third Circuits still stand, the Eleventh
Circuit is the only post-Becerra court that has dealt with the issue of
conversion therapy.94 However, the Eleventh Circuit still erred in its analysis
and when it ruled that laws banning mental health providers from engaging

87. See id. (arguing that the law was viewpoint discrimination because it advocated
for a particular viewpoint regarding gender and sexuality).
88. E.g., id. at 869 (finding a failure to prove cognizable harm).
89. E.g., id. at 868 (recognizing that protecting the wellbeing of minors is a
traditional and well-respected government interest).
90. See id. at 869 (ruling that the presented data lacked the scientific rigor necessary
to be compelling and that it failed to show true causation between SOCE and harm).
91. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 868 (arguing that the presented data was not compelling
enough to necessitate the law).
92. See id. (failing to address the issue of narrow tailoring).
93. See id. at 859-64 (holding in the majority that laws banning therapists from
engaging in conversion therapy is viewpoint discrimination, fails strict scrutiny, and
violates the First Amendment freedom of speech rights of mental health providers).
94. See id. at 859-64 (addressing Becerra and professional speech).
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in conversion therapy with minors are unconstitutional.95
A. The Correct Level of Scrutiny in Assessing SOCE Bans Is Not Strict
Scrutiny Because Laws Banning SOCE Primarily Regulate Conduct and
Only Incidentally Regulate Speech
Across the differing opinions of the Ninth, Third, and Eleventh Circuits,
one of the primary areas in which the three courts’ opinions diverged was
determining which level of scrutiny was appropriate to evaluate the law’s
constitutionality.96 Before Becerra, the Ninth and Third Circuits operated
under the reasoning that “professional speech” was its own gray area, a
category of speech that did not receive the full protection of the law, namely,
strict scrutiny.97 However, since the Supreme Court rejected this notion in
Becerra, so too did the court in Otto.98 Thus, as a content-based law that did
not seek to regulate any of the categories of speech that the Supreme Court
has officially recognized as being less deserving of the full protection of the
Constitution, the law was subject to the strict scrutiny test.99
While Becerra firmly pushed back on the conceptualization of
professional speech as its own category of speech that would not receive the
full benefits of First Amendment protections, it raised two critical exceptions
to the presumption of applying strict scrutiny.100 These two exceptions that
allow the regulation of professional speech occur when (1) professionals are
95. See id. at 866-67 (ruling for the first time on the constitutionality of conversion
therapy bans after the Supreme Court’s rejection of a professional speech exemption);
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2361 (2018) (rejecting
the notion that professional speech belongs to a category of free speech that is less
protected than other speech and thus not analyzed under strict scrutiny).
96. Compare Otto, 981 F.3d at 867-68 (applying the highest bar of strict scrutiny),
with Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229-31 (9th Cir. 2014) (utilizing only rational
basis review on the grounds that the law in question was primarily regulating professional
conduct), and King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 235-37 (3d Cir. 2014)
(employing intermediate scrutiny on the grounds that the law in question was regulating
professional speech, which is protected by the Constitution but not to the fullest extent
of strict scrutiny).
97. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229-31 (finding that the law in question primarily
regulates conduct and that the speech in question is professional speech and thus the law
in question is not subject to strict scrutiny); King, 767 F.3d 216 at 229-233 (determining
that the law in question regulates professional speech rather than conduct).
98. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 861 (rejecting the category of professional speech as a
lesser protected category).
99. See id. at 864-68 (reasoning that strict scrutiny was the appropriate test).
100. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (providing two
exceptions where the Supreme Court has recognized lesser protections for professional
speech, but those exceptions did not hinge on the fact that professionals were speaking).
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engaged in commercial speech or when (2) the state seeks to regulate the
conduct of professionals and that conduct incidentally involves speech.101
For example, regulation of conversion therapy does not involve commercial
speech, but it certainly does involve professional conduct.102
In Becerra’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s historical allowance for
the regulation of professional conduct that incidentally involved speech, the
majority opinion in Becerra pointed to Planned Parenthood v. Casey.103 In
Planned Parenthood, the Supreme Court determined that a law requiring
informed consent did not primarily focus on speech and instead only
implicated speech “as part of the practice of medicine.”104 Therefore, the
regulation was not subject to strict scrutiny but rather “subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the [s]tate,” as are all medical procedures and
conduct.105 Sexual orientation change efforts conducted by mental health
professionals are inherently medical psychiatric treatments.106 Thus, as the
test for direct vs. indirect regulation is different, determining whether a law
directly or indirectly regulates speech is one of the first steps in determining
the appropriate level of scrutiny and the constitutionality of anti-SOCE
laws.107
While anti-SOCE laws involve speech, they do not directly regulate

101. See id. at 2372 (discussing the two historical exceptions in which the Supreme
Court has “afforded less protection for professional speech”); see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-58 (1978) (recognizing the validity of applying lower
standards of review for commercial speech and of applying a lower level of scrutiny in
the regulation of conduct that incidentally burdened speech).
102. See BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2017) (stating that
mental health providers are prohibited from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts
with minors).
103. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (invoking Casey and
regulating professional conduct involving speech as a medical practice); see also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (plurality opinion) (finding that
medical practitioners’ first amendment freedom of speech rights are not infringed upon
by the regulation of medical practice).
104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 838 (stating that medical conduct which incidentally involves
speech can be treated by the state as professional conduct and regulated thusly).
105. E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (concluding that medical conduct incidentally
involving speech is not subject to strict scrutiny).
106. See BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2017) (providing in
detail that mental health providers are prohibited from engaging in sexual orientation
change efforts with minors).
107. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (finding that deferential review is appropriate for
examining laws regulating medical conduct that incidentally involves speech).
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speech.108 Instead, laws such as the one in Otto directly regulate the medical
practice of conversion therapy.109 Laws regulating conversion therapy
regulate SOCE in its totality, including aversive methods of conversion
therapy, such as exposure to unpleasant stimuli and talk therapy; in this way,
the speech within it is only one facet of that practice that is incidentally
regulated.110 Furthermore, talk therapy in and of itself is primarily a medical
treatment.111 To characterize talk therapy as simply a regular conversation
or discussion of thoughts and beliefs is incorrect.112 According to the APA,
psychotherapy conducted through talking and dialogue can take various
forms.113 However, each form is scientifically geared at analyzing and, in
many ways, reframing the human mind.114 Talk therapy does involve
expression and dialogue between patient and provider, but at its heart, it is a
medical procedure that is conducted by a medical professional aimed at
changing thought and behavior.115 Thus, laws banning mental health
providers from engaging in conversion therapy with minors should be
recognized as conduct regulations that incidentally involve speech and
should not be subject to strict scrutiny.116
B. Anti-SOCE Laws are Not Viewpoint Discrimination
The Eleventh Circuit’s majority opinion in Otto advanced the idea that the
108. See § 9-106 (stating that mental health providers are prohibited from engaging
in sexual orientation change efforts with minors).
109. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 865-66 (giving background on the law in question, which
only sought to regulate the medical practice of SOCE and excluded its religious
administration).
110. See Progress Map, supra note 4 (discussing different forms of conversion
therapy, including the aversive practices).
111. See generally Understanding Psychotherapy and How it Works, AM. PSYCH.
ASS’N (July 31, 2020), https://www.apa.org/topics/psychotherapy/understanding
(establishing that talk therapy, also known as psychotherapy, is a well-recognized form
of therapy).
112. See generally Different Approaches to Psychotherapy, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N
(2009), https://www.apa.org/topics/psychotherapy/approaches (articulating, among
other things, the medical benefits associated with each approach to psychotherapy).
113 See id. (examining the five broad theories of psychotherapy).
114. See id. (reiterating that talk therapy is a well-established form of therapy that can
be utilized to change patterns of thought and behavior).
115. See Understanding Psychotherapy and How it Works, supra note 111
(explaining how talk therapy operates to treat people by changing thought and behavior).
116. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (stating that medical conduct incidentally involving speech is not subject to
strict scrutiny).
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particular city ordinance, which in content was extremely similar to the laws
passed in California and New Jersey, constituted viewpoint
discrimination.117 The court concluded this because in their view, the
ordinances advanced a certain viewpoint and restricted an opposing
viewpoint.118 This conclusion differs from those of the Ninth Circuit and the
Third Circuit, which both concluded that the laws in question were not
viewpoint discrimination.119 Therefore, laws prohibiting licensed mental
health professionals from engaging in conversion therapy with minors, such
as the law at issue in Otto, should not be considered viewpoint
discrimination.120
The court in Otto concluded that the anti-sexual orientation change effort
ordinances are viewpoint discrimination in effect because they censor those
mental health professionals that believe sexuality can be changed or that
gender is cemented at birth.121 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit said these
bans censor these providers and prevent them from freely expressing their
beliefs and opinions.122 Laws limiting sexual orientation change efforts are
not viewpoint discrimination because they do not prevent mental health
professionals from freely expressing their views.123 The ordinances in
117. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 864 (11th Cir. 2020) (arguing that
the ordinance was viewpoint discrimination because it advocated for one viewpoint while
censoring another); see also CAL. BUS. & PROS. CODE § 865.1 (2013) (“Under no
circumstances shall a mental health provider engage in sexual orientation change efforts
with a patient under 18 years of age.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1–55(2)(a) (“A person who
is licensed to provide professional counseling . . . shall not engage in sexual orientation
change efforts with a person under 18 years of age.”).
118. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 864 (reasoning that under the law psychiatrists would not
be able to advocate for SOCE and beliefs regarding it).
119. Compare Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (holding that the law only regulates
treatment), with King, 767 F.3d at 237 (concluding that the law fits within the category
of professional speech).
120. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 864–66 (examining the constitutionality of the ban on
SOCE); see also BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2017) (quoting, “It
shall be unlawful for any provider to practice conversion therapy on any individual who
is a minor . . . .”).
121. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 864 (arguing that the ordinances “[c]odify a particular
viewpoint—sexual orientation is immutable, but gender is not—and prohibit the
therapists from advancing any other perspective when counseling clients.").").
122. E.g., Otto, 981 F.3d at 864 (arguing that laws limiting sexual orientation change
efforts are viewpoint discrimination because they prevent mental health professionals
from expressing opinions contrary to views advocated for by the government).
123. Compare Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2014) (deciding
that the law fell under the category of professional speech because it only regulates
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question in Otto only prevented mental health professionals from engaging
in the therapeutic practice of sexual orientation change efforts with
minors.124 This limitation only applies to the medical practice of conversion
therapy.125 It does not prohibit medical professionals from engaging in any
discussion of conversion therapy with minors or from advocating for their
personal beliefs.126 Under this law, it is still entirely permissible for mental
health providers to express opinions different from those allegedly supported
by the ordinance.127 For example, a mental health provider could still
communicate to patients their belief that the minor may be confused about
their gender or sexual orientation, their belief that conversion therapy can
change, or correct, sexuality or gender expression, or even their belief that
homosexuality is a mental disorder.128 More importantly, the law in question
does not prevent mental health providers from recommending conversion
therapy as a medical practice to minors or suggesting that they undergo
conversion therapy in either a location that allows conversion therapy or
through exempted means, such as faith-based conversion therapy.129
Viewpoint discrimination, by its nature, targets and censors a particular
viewpoint; however, the ordinance in Otto is not viewpoint discrimination
because it does not censor or target certain views.130 Instead, laws such as
the one in Otto only prevent mental health providers from engaging in certain

treatment), with King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216,237 (3d Cir. 2014)
(concluding that the law in question was not viewpoint discrimination).
124. E.g., BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2017) (declaring it
illegal for mental health providers to engage in sexual orientation change efforts with
minors).
125. See BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-105 (2017) (defining
“provider” as “any person who is licensed by the state to provide professional counseling,
or who performs counseling as part of his or her professional training” and excluding
“members of the clergy or other religious leaders who are acting in their roles as clergy
or pastoral counselors, or are providing religious counseling or instruction to
congregants” thereby only applying to medical professionals in the mental health field).
126. See id. (specifying that only conversion therapy is illegal).
127. See id. (limiting sexual orientation change efforts).
128. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 875 (11th Cir. 2020) (Martin, J.,
dissenting) (discussing how mental health professionals can still express their own
personal opinions).
129. See § 9-106 (limiting the practice of conversion therapy with minors); see also
Otto, 981 F.3d at 872 (Martin, J., dissenting) (explaining that the ordinance allows
unlicensed counselors to practice SOCE).
130. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 872 (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that the law is not
viewpoint discrimination).
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harmful practices.131 Therefore, as in Pickup and King, the courts should
conclude that laws prohibiting or limiting sexual orientation change efforts
are not viewpoint discrimination.132
C. Anti-SOCE Laws are Capable of Standing up to Strict Scrutiny
Regardless of which level of scrutiny courts apply in assessing the
constitutionality of laws prohibiting limiting SOCE, these laws should pass
even the most rigid freedom of speech constitutionality test of strict
scrutiny.133 The strict scrutiny test only requires that the law be narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. Laws banning mental
health providers from engaging in conversion therapy with minors pass this
test.134
It should not be taken as a given that legislators will create narrowly
tailored anti-SOCE laws.135 Instead, the courts must individually examine
laws to see if they pass this aspect of strict scrutiny.136 In assessing if a law
passes strict scrutiny, a narrowly tailored law is constructed to be the least
restrictive means to achieve the government’s compelling state interest.137
In other words, legislators must specifically craft anti-SOCE laws to place
as minimal restrictions as possible on First Amendment rights.138
131. Compare § 9-106 (making conversion therapy for minors illegal), with Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the law was not viewpoint
discrimination), and King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 237 (3d Cir. 2014)
(determining that the law in question was not viewpoint discrimination).
132. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (concluding that the law was not viewpoint
discrimination because it did not advocate for one view); King, 767 F.3d 216 at 237
(finding that the law in question was not viewpoint discrimination).
133. Cf. Otto, 981 F.3d at 872, 878, 880 (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing, in part, that
Florida had sufficiently passed the burden of strict scrutiny by creating a narrowly
tailored law that achieved the compelling government interest of protecting minors from
harm and that the state had reasonably demonstrated that conversion therapy or sexual
orientation change efforts are actually dangerous and harmful to minors).
134. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 155 (2015) (defining strict scrutiny
and further finding that content-based laws that target speech must pass strict scrutiny).
135. See BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2017) (modeling the
type of law in question).
136. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (defining
narrowly tailored as “choosing the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest”). See also United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (adding
to the definition of narrowly tailored that “[I]f a less restrictive alternative would serve
the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”).
137. E.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., 492 U.S. at 126 (defining narrowly tailored as
being the least restrictive the law can be to further the articulated interest).
138. See id. (providing the constitutional definition for narrow tailoring).
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Additionally, if another less restrictive measure is available to achieve the
same compelling government interest, then inherently, the law in question is
not the least restrictive means available. It would then not be narrowly
tailored or constitutional under strict scrutiny.139
Assuming that all anti-SOCE laws would be similar to those discussed,
they should all be considered narrowly tailored.140 The compelling
government interest at the heart of each of these laws banning conversion
therapy practices was the legitimate government interest in protecting
minors’ wellbeing.141 Specifically, it was the legitimate and compelling
government interest of protecting minors from the trauma and harm caused
by experiencing sexual orientation change efforts.142 Since the government’s
interest is in protecting minors from the harmful effects of sexual orientation
change efforts, courts must determine whether or not the bans were
constructed in the least restrictive manner possible to protect children from
the harm of sexual orientation change efforts.143
Laws limiting licensed mental health providers from engaging in sexual
orientation change efforts with minors are sufficiently narrow to pass
muster.144 In these cases, the compelling government interest in question is
the protection of minors from the mental and physical harm associated with

139. See Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. at 813 (adding the condition that if an alternate,
less restrictive approach is available to the state, then the law in question is not the least
restrictive).
140. Compare Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 864 (11th Cir. 2020)
(exemplifying laws of its kind), with Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221–23 (9th Cir.
2014) (explaining the SOCE ban at issue), and King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767
F.3d 216, 221-21 (3d Cir. 2014) (describing the SOCE ban in question).
141. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 868 (identifying protecting minors as the government
interest); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (recognizing the protection of minors as an important
government interest); King, 767 F.3d at 222 (identifying the protection of minors as the
compelling government interest); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk
Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (finding that “safeguarding the . . . wellbeing of a minor
.”is a compelling government interest); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57
(1982) (reaffirming that protecting minors is a compelling government interest).
142. Compare Otto, 981 F.3d at 875–76 (Martin, J., dissenting) (listing SOCE’s
harmful effects), with Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222–24 (discussing the harm of SOCE), and
King, 767 F.3d at 238 (focusing on the harmful effects of SOCE).
143. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 875–76 (Martin, J. dissenting) (stating the negative effects
of SOCE); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222–24, 1231–32 (discussing the trauma of SOCE);
King, 767 F.3d at 238 (focusing on the negative impact of SOCE); see also Sable
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (defining narrowly tailored in
terms of the least restrictive means possible).
144. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 859–60 (reviewing the local Florida ordinance at issue).
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sexual orientation change efforts.145 The clearest way to protect minors from
this harmful practice is to stop or limit this practice.146 The law in Otto could
be more restrictive by preventing all forms of sexual orientation change
efforts, including faith-based conversion therapy.147 Additionally, the law in
question is very narrowly tailored to the type of speech it impacts.148 The
law only prevents mental health professionals from engaging in talk therapy
practices involved in conversion therapy.149 It does not prevent mental health
providers from giving their personal opinions on sexuality, gender, or
conversion therapy.150 Since the scope of the law is narrow and the only
clear way to prevent minors from being harmed by the practice, laws like
these are sufficiently narrowly tailored.151
The second aspect of strict scrutiny is that it must serve a compelling state
interest.152 Every law banning mental health counselors from engaging in
sexual orientation change efforts with minors aims to achieve a compelling
government interest, namely protecting minors from harm.153 Protecting
minors from harm is a clearly recognized compelling government interest
the Supreme Court has upheld.154 In each of the cases that dealt with
conversion therapy bans, the circuit courts identified protecting minors from
harm as the compelling state interest.155
145. E.g., id. at 868 (identifying protecting minors as the compelling government
interest raised by the state); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (discussing the necessity of
protecting minors); King, 767 F.3d at 222 (raising the importance of protecting the
wellbeing of minors).
146. See BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2017) (specifying that
only mental health professionals may not engage in SOCE with minors).
147. See id. (preventing mental health providers from engaging in SOCE with
minors).
148. See generally id. (providing details on the anti-SOCE law).
149. See generally id. (stating the limitation on the therapeutic practice).
150. See id. (limiting the practice of SOCE).
151. See id. (stating that mental health professionals may not engage in SOCE with
minors).
152. E.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 155 (2015) (addressing the
constitutional test necessary for content-based speech laws and defining the test of strict
scrutiny).
153. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 868 (11th Cir. 2020) (reviewing
the state’s argument that the law is meant to protect the wellbeing of minors).
154. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982) (finding that protecting minors is a compelling government interest).
155. Compare Otto, 981 F.3d at 868 (stating the compelling government interest),
with Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2014) (giving credence to
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The Ninth and Third Circuit Courts accepted that sexual orientation
change efforts present clear harm to the physical and mental wellbeing of
LGBTQ+ youth.156 The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, rejected this
idea.157 Instead, the majority opinion in Otto argues that the goal of the law
is “to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.”158 This argument
foregrounds the idea that, while protecting children is a vital government
interest, speech “cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”159
The majority opinion in Otto completely mischaracterizes the goals and
intentions of the bans on conversion therapy.160 The ordinance in question
in Otto does not prevent mental health providers from speaking on their
different viewpoints to minors or exposing minors to a view that the majority
may not hold. Namely, it does not prevent mental health providers from
expressing a belief that homosexuality or gender dysphoria is a mental
illness.161 In fact, under the ordinance provisions, a mental health provider
working with a minor could still legally express these personally held
opinions to the minor and could still recommend that the minor undergo
sexual orientation change efforts elsewhere.162 Therefore, the ban does not
insulate children from specific ideas or viewpoints, nor does it foreground
protecting the wellbeing of minors), and King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216,
237-38 (3d Cir. 2014) (identifying protecting minors as the compelling government
interest).
156. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (finding that the protection of minors was the state
interest); King, 767 F.3d at 246 (identifying protecting minors as the compelling interest).
157. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 869 (arguing that the presented evidence failed to
rigorously demonstrate the link between sexual orientation change efforts and harm to
minors).
158. E.g., id. at 868 (determining that the power of the government to protect children
from harm does not include protecting children from opposing viewpoints).
159. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1975) (stating that
the government’s prerogative to protect children from harm does not include the ability
to prevent children from hearing opposing views).
160. Cf. Otto, 981 F.3d at 868 (finding that the law in question is a content-based
restriction and viewpoint discrimination that seeks to insulate children from a set of ideas
or viewpoints that the majority does not hold and that children are not harmed by being
exposed to different viewpoints).
161. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 868 (expressing that the ordinance’s attempts to shield
minors from exposure to certain viewpoints); BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 9-106 (2017) (specifying only that mental health professionals may not engage in
SOCE with minors).
162. See BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2017) (prohibiting the
practice of SOCE with minors, but not the discussion of or recommendations for SOCE
with minors).

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol30/iss1/3

22

Stoughton: Toxic Therapy: Examining the Constitutionality of Conversion Ther

2021]

TOXIC THERAPY

103

exposure to these viewpoints as the harm caused to minors.163 Instead, the
ban only prevents mental health providers from engaging in a specific
therapeutic, medical practice, specifically therapy, changing a person’s
sexual or gender identity with minors.164 Furthermore, it prevents mental
health providers from engaging in a medical practice that has demonstrably
harmful effects on the mental health of LGBTQ+ adults and minors.165
The real harm of sexual orientation change efforts is well documented and
well established.166 LGBTQ+ youth that undergo conversion therapy are
more than twice as likely to commit suicide as their peers who did not
experience conversion therapy.167 This is even more worrying when taken
alongside the fact that in 2020, 40% of LGBTQ youth considered suicide in
the past twelve months, with more than half of transgender and nonbinary
youths having considered suicide.168
The American Psychological
Association (“APA”) has openly disavowed sexual orientation change
efforts and has documented the harmful effects of sexual orientation change
efforts.169 The APA’s task force on sexual orientation change efforts has
identified some of the harmful mental effects of conversion, including
anxiety, depression, suicidality, increased guilt, loss of spiritual faith, and a
sense of personal failure associated with exposure to sexual orientation
change efforts.170 The consensus of the medical community that sexual
orientation change efforts are ineffectual and harmful to minors should be
sufficient to demonstrate that sexual orientation change efforts cause actual
harm and that the states have a legitimate interest in limiting conversion

163. See id. (prohibiting only the medical practice of SOCE).
164. See id. (limiting the conversion therapy practices).
165. See generally, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, Conversion

Therapy (Feb. 2018), https://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/2018/Converstion
_Therapy.aspx/ (discussing the AACAP’s belief that SOCE harms LGBTQ+ youth).
166. E.g., The Trevor Project National Survey, supra note 9 (documenting the
psychological harm experienced by survivors of conversion therapy).
167. E.g., id. (reviewing the negative effects of SOCE on LGBTQ+ youth including
increased suicidality).
168. See id. (discussing the negative mental health outcomes for survivors of SOCE).
169. E.g., AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL
ORIENTATION (2009), https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf
(providing analysis on the psychological harm associated with sexual orientation change
efforts conducted on minors).
170. See id. (examining the psychological harm done to minors by sexual orientation
change efforts).
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therapy practices to protect minors.171
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The Supreme Court has established that protecting minors’ physical and
psychological health is paramount.172 LGBTQ+ youth across America
continue to face discrimination and harm.173 With suicide rates among young
people in the United States steadily rising for the last twenty years, young
LGBTQ+ people are disproportionately more likely than their non-LGBTQ+
peers to attempt suicide.174 These rates are even higher for LGBTQ+
children who have experienced conversion therapy and suffered conversion
therapy’s consequential mental health effects.175
Reading between the lines, the message conveyed by Otto is apparent, that
LGBTQ+ children are less deserving of the full protection of the law and
government than their cisgender, heterosexual peers.176 While the United
States Constitution provides comprehensive and robust protections for
citizens’ freedom of speech, these protections are not without limitations for
the sake of compelling government interests.177 To deny LGBTQ+ youth
vital laws intended to secure their protection is not only a miscarriage of
justice but an obvious statement from the courts that protecting the physical
and mental wellbeing of LGBTQ+ minors does not carry the same weight as
considerations for the wellbeing of cisgender, heterosexual minors.178
171. See id., at 5-6 (dissecting the psychological harm done to minors by sexual
orientation change efforts).
172. E.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982) (finding that “safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor”
is a compelling government interest).
173. See generally, HUM. RTS. WATCH, LIKE WALKING THROUGH A HAILSTORM:
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT YOUTH IN US SCHOOLS at 1-2 (2020),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/08/walking-through-hailstorm/discriminationagainst-lgbt-youth-us-schools (reviewing the discrimination LGBTQ+ youths face,
particularly in school).
174. See WILLIAMS INST., supra note 2 (reporting on a study that examined the
experiences of LGBTQ+ youth who were subjected to SOCE).
175. See id. (detailing the mental health struggles of LGBTQ+ youth).
176. E.g., Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 860, 871 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding
that a law meant to protect LGBTQ+ children from a practice associated with heightened
suicide rates among LGBTQ+ youth was invalid).
177. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 170-72 (2015) (stating that contentbased restrictions on speech can only stand if they survive strict scrutiny, which requires
the government to prove a compelling interest).
178. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 870 (stating that there was not plausible harm to necessitate
the State stepping in to protect the wellbeing of LGBTQ+ minors).
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While many states have adopted or proposed laws that limit conversion
therapy for minors, more states should seek to provide increased protection
for LGBTQ+ youth.179 Already, new challenges are appearing to state
conversion therapy bans. Petitioners have already requested that Otto itself
be reheard.180 Eventually, another suit similar to the Ninth, Third, and
Eleventh Circuits will rise up.181 When those challenges arise, given the
standing confusion over the issue of conversion therapy, the Supreme Court
must review conversion therapy and put this discussion to rest.182
V. CONCLUSION
As the scientific community continues to deepen its understanding of the
harmful effects that sexual orientation change efforts have on young
members of the LGBTQ+ community, and as more citizens and legislators
become aware of these issues, the support for ending conversion therapy in
America continues to grow.183 The constitutionality of these laws is a
prescient issue as more states continue to adopt laws banning conversion
therapy.184 Although the Supreme Court in Becerra dealt a blow to the lower
court’s previous interpretation of the constitutionality of laws prohibiting
sexual orientation change efforts, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion was
not a death blow.185 Laws banning conversion therapy can withstand the
challenge of strict scrutiny because they are the least restrictive means of
protecting minors from the harm caused by sexual orientation change

179. See Progress Map, supra note 4 (mapping the adoption and proposal of antiSOCE laws).
180. Brief for 25 Cities and Counties in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 11, Otto
v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-10604) (requesting
rehearing en banc).
181. See generally, Brendan Pierson, Md. Governor, AG Immune from Challenge to
Gay “Conversion” Ban, REUTERS (June 16, 2021, 10:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com
/legal/litigation/md-governor-ag-immune-challenge-gay-conversion-ban-2021-06-15/
(discussing a recent challenge to the Maryland ban on SOCE).
182. See id. (giving an overview on the adoption and proposal of anti-SOCE laws).
See also Brief for 25 Cities and Counties in Support of Defendant-Appellant, Otto v. City
of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-10604) (petitioning for rehearing
on the basis that anti-SOCE laws are constitutional).
183. See Pierson, supra note 181 (detailing the growing support for anti-SOCE laws).
184. See Pierson, supra note 181 (tracking the states that have proposed anti-SOCE
laws in 2020).
185. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018)
(rejecting the notion that professional speech belongs to a category of free speech that is
less protected and thus not analyzed under strict scrutiny).
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efforts.186
The Supreme Court should review the issue of the
constitutionality of conversion therapy bans to put to rest the lower courts’
confusion on how to address conversion therapy bans and the
constitutionality of such laws.187 Given that anti-SOCE bans should pass
even strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court should find that laws banning mental
health professionals from engaging in conversion therapy with minors are
constitutional.188

186. E.g., Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 873 (11th Cir. 2020) (Martin, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the bans on SOCE would pass strict scrutiny).
187. Brief for 25 Cities and Counties in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 12, Otto
v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-10604) (arguing the need
for continued litigation and rehearing on the matter of anti-SOCE laws).
188. See id. at 10-11 (reiterating the need for anti-SOCE laws as they are necessary
and intended to promote the safety of LGBTQ+ youth).

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol30/iss1/3

26

